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Kingston (Rebecca), Montesquieu and the Parlement of Bordeaux, Genève, Droz 
(Collection Histoire des idées et critique littéraire, n° 324), 1996, 329 pp. 
Kingston's endeavour to reconstruct the political theory of Montesquieu takes 
into account his practical experience as a member of the Parlement of Bordeaux. 
There, Montesquieu acted as a judge in the chamber of criminal justice for the 
exceptionally long period of ten and a half years (1715-1724), before he sold his 
office. Kingston characterizes the judicial socialization of Montesquieu as domina-
ted by practice in the current jurisprudence. She then reconstructs the political ideo-
logy of those Arrêts du Parlement which Montesquieu coauthored. The Parlement 
defended in opposition to the king, the local bien public, leaving any religious legi-
timacy aside. It also outlined its own competence of administration against the clien-
telistic approach of the city council. As the better guarantee for grain supply, it 
defended the importance of free trade against state intervention. Kingston calls this 
discourse an «associational mode of argument» (p. 94 ff.), because it considers 
individual and collective interests and the values linked to them as an important 
basis of politics. The emerging state should not only respect this basis, but rely on it. 
Kingston's reconstruction of the Parlement's criminal justice provides us with the 
standard information about the practice of a royal court. An important part of the 
caseload was caused by the corruption and poor jurisdiction of lower courts. Like 
other higher courts, the Tournelle modified half of the death penalties of the lower 
courts. Moreover, since torture was used less and less, moderation was advocated. 
By analysing Montesquieu's theoretical works from the Bordeaux years without 
referring much to secondary literature, Kingston shows how Montesquieu distanced 
himself from the model of heroic politics of the Romans. In its place he suggested 
stability and welfare as better political orientations. As a result of Montesquieu's 
analysis of the Romans' success, Kingston presents Montesquieu's argument that 
the rulers should encourage those forms of associations which, according to him, 
improve morality, the foundation of every good regime. From these readings King-
ston derives as the fundamental idea of the «Esprit des lois» that the multiplicity of 
associations leads to very different requirements of law. No universal model can be 
applied to all situations. 
Montesquieu claims that the state should use criminal justice as a means to 
manage existing forms of social control not pretending to dominate them. Thus the 
state should take into account existing fears (e.g. to be socially defamed), and not try 
to terrorize (Hobbes) the citizen. Montesquieu supposes this to be inefficient. In 
general, law should be used only as the last solution for a conflict. In this chapter 
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Kingston points to some connections to Montesquieu's judicial practice : he suggests 
not to punish words - as the Parlement did not treat many cases of lèse-majesté. The 
principle that deterrence must be measured is related to the practice of the court. 
Both findings are commonplace. The first, because the cases of lèse-majesté occur-
red rarely. The second, because clemency of upper instances appeared in all French 
higher courts in the 18th century. 
As a result Kingston argues that Montesquieu was «not the defender of» Parle-
ment «as one form of intermediary body». He pleaded for a «strong central and uni-
form application of criminal justice. It serves in part as a prerequisite for his theory 
of political liberty». 
This study of the social history of ideas shows connections between the argu-
ments of the judicial company in which Montesquieu served and his theoretical 
ideas. But, where Kingston approaches the court's practice, the relation between 
Montesquieu's ideas and the judicial practice is very commonplace. A more sophis-
ticated (e.g. quantitative) analysis of the courts' and Montesquieu's language might 
have led to more precise results. Reflections about the sociopolitical positions of the 
high judges in Ancien Régime France (cf. M. Andrews: Law, Magistracy, and 
Crime in Old Regime Paris, 1735-89, Cambridge, 1994), and about the relation bet-
ween power and discourse might have enriched this «social history of ideas». But it 
is still possible that the book might lead to a closer link of the research on the history 
of ideas with the social realities of Ancien Régime justice, even if the nature of this 
link should be refined methodologically. 
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ERRATUM 
CHS, 1997, Vol. 1 , n° 2, p. 117 
La référence de l'ouvrage suivant, dont un compte rendu est paru dans le précé-
dent numéro de CHS, était incomplète ; il faut lire : 
Durand (Bernard), Arbitraire du juge et consuetudo delinquendi: la doctrine pénale 
en Europe du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle, Montpellier, Publications de la Société 
d'histoire du droit et des institutions des anciens pays de droit écrit, V, 1993. 
